Ruth Millikan
- Beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptions are all examples of mental representations. Representations are interesting objects because they bear a semantic relation to the world.
They represent something, are about things, properties, states of affairs extrinsic to them.
- Intentionality is a philosophers’ word. It is 'aboutness': words, pictures, signs, beliefs, desires, and, indeed, intentions are all about things.
- The problem of intentionality: How do mental representations mean?
- One naturalistic way to tackle the problem
Teleosemantics
The satisfaction condition for a desire is the result it is selected to produce, the truth condition for a belief the condition that ensures that this result will ensue.
More generally (Millikan), an indicative representation stands for the condition that will enable the behaviour it prompts in its ‘consumer’ to achieve its end.
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