Tutorial #10. Kripke on Names. Discussion Questions

After having read the relevant parts of Naming and Necessity think about these questions.

• What is the difference between a priori-a posteriori and necessary-contingent?
• Kripke argues that some a priori propositions are contingent. Do you find his argument convincing?
• What is Kripke’s argument against Frege and Russell? Why does he think that names do not have some form of descriptive meaning?
• What reasons does Kripke have for claiming that names are rigid designators?
• How does it happen that 'Pegasus' is a non-referring name at our world?
• How are contingent identity statements possible?
• Are mental states identical to brain states for Kripke?
• What’s essential to pain? Could pain be painless?

Tutorial #10. Kripke on Names. Some Consequences

---> Essentialism
+ Essential property: a property an object (or kind) cannot fail to have.
- Example: being a football player is not essential to Ronaldo but being human is essential to him.
- Example: Water is H2O. There could be a colorless, tasteless liquid that was just like water, and also called 'water' by people, but with molecular structure XYZ. Then, that liquid would NOT be water: The essence of water is it’s molecular structure (H2O).

+ What about what seem to be contingent identity statements involving rigid designators?
E.g.
- 'Hesperus is Phosphoros.'
- 'Heat is the total energy of molecular motion.'

Kripke: The alleged contingency of both these sentences is an illusion!
They are a posteriori but necessary. The illusion comes from confusing necessity and a prioriticity!

--> How are contingent identity statements possible?
Everything that exists is necessarily self-identical.
Referring expressions in some identity statements pick out different objects at different possible worlds.

Tutorial #10. Kripke on Names. Rigid Designators

Rigid Designator
A rigid designator designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in all possible worlds in which that thing exists and does not designate anything else in those possible worlds in which that thing does not exist.

--> Kripke: Ordinary proper names are rigid designators!

NOTE
In saying that 'Saul Kripke' is a rigid designator we mean that the name as we use it in our actual world language refers to the same individual at all possible worlds--including worlds in which he has a different name.
Kripke couldn’t be Ronaldo even though he could have been named 'Ronaldo.'

Kripke vs. Russell
- Ordinary proper names are NOT disguised descriptions for Kripke.
- Ordinary proper names are mere tags (they don’t have senses or convey descriptions).
- We confer names on objects by tagging (baptizing, dubbing) or via descriptions that fix reference.

--> Names are passed down in the linguistic community through a causal chain going back to the tagging (the "baptism").

Tutorial #10. Kripke on Names. Nuts and Bolts

Bits of Terminology

Possible Worlds: Ways things could have been.
The actual world: the way things actually are.
Possible worlds, in philosophy, are used to explain modal notions like logical possibility, necessity and contingency.

--> Necessary & Contingent
- A state of affairs is logically possible if it’s true at some possible world.
- A proposition is necessarily true if it’s true at all possible worlds.
- A proposition is contingently true if it’s true at the actual world (or the world we’re considering) but false at some other possible world.


--> A priori & A posteriori
- A priori: knowable "before" experience. E.g. "All bachelors are unmarried."
- A posteriori: can only be known "after" experience. E.g. "Miriam is 10 ft. tall"

NOTE
A priority and a posteriority are epistemic notions.
Necessity and contingency are metaphysical notions.


+ Kripke On A Priori\A Posteriori & Necessity\Contingency:

Some a priori propositions are contingent!
Example: The standard meter rod in Paris is one meter long.

Some a posteriori propositions are necessary!
Example: Water is H2O.

Tutorial # 9. Russell. On Denoting. Discussion Questions

After having read Russell's On Denoting, try to think about the following questions.

• What is a definitive description? Give examples.
• What is the logical form of a sentence? Why is it important?
• How would Russell analyze the sentence “Catwoman is hot”?
• Is ordinary language “good enough for philosophy”, or does it require modifications? Why?
• How can we talk about things which do not exist? Think about Meinong’s, Frege’s and Russell’s answers to this question. Which is the most convincing? Why?
  
• What is Russell’s criticism to Frege’s theory of meaning?
  
• How does Russell treat propositional attitudes? How would he analyse the sentence "Matteo believes that the present queen of Italy is hot"?
  
• What is the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description? Give examples. Why is it related to Russell’s analysis of definitive descriptions?

Tutorial # 9. Russell. On Denoting. Denoting in "On Denoting"

The subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and mathematics, but also in the theory of knowledge.

- No general characterization of denoting is given, only a list of “denoting phrases.”

A man,
Some man,
Any man,
Every man,
All men,
The present King of England.

"A phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form"

+ The notion of a variable is fundamental to the theory of denoting.

A variable x "is essentially and wholly undetermined."

A proposition is always of the form C(x)

A proposition results from replacing the variable with a denoting phrase, as with C(a man).

Russell’s general thesis is that propositions containing denoting phrases are reducible to propositions not containing them.

*The Reduction

C(a man) means C(x) and x is human for some values of x.

"I met a man." means "I met x, and x is human for some values of x."
"All men are mortal” means “If x is a man, then x is mortal for all values of x"

--> “a man” and “all men” are contextually defined:
they have meaning only when embedded in a larger context.

*Definite Descriptions
Denoting phrases preceded by "the" are "by far the most interesting and difficult of denoting phrases."
Like the other denoting phrases, definite descriptions are contextually defined.

- Strict use of a denoting phrase in the sentence “The father of Charles II was executed” involves:

Existence: x was father of Charles II, for some value of x.

Uniqueness: if y was father of Charles II then y is identical with x, for any values of x who was father of Charles II and any value of y.

The Reduction of Definite Descriptions
The definite description "the father of Charles II" may occur in propositions of the form C(the father of Charles II).

The general analysis of C(the father of Charles II) combines existence and uniqueness:

For some value of x, x was father of Charles II, and C(x), and if y was father of Charles II, then y is identical to x, for any value of y

"The father of Charles II was executed” is:
For some value of x, x was father of Charles II, and x was executed, and if y was father of Charles II, then y is identical to x, for any value of y.


*** Consequences for Knowledge


Acquaintance and Description
The theory of denoting has consequences for knowledge.
We know things in two ways:

I) By being acquainted with them,
II) Through descriptions of them.
If we can apprehend (think about) a proposition, then we are acquainted with all its constituents.
If we know an object (say, someone else’s mind) only by description, then our knowledge can be expressed in propositions with denoting phrases, which do not contain the object itself.
We then know only the properties of the object and do not know any propositions
which contain the object itself.

Tutorial # 9. Russell. On Denoting. The Problem

The Puzzles.

"How can I think the thing which is not?"
(Plato)

* A denoting phrase may or may not denote an actual object.
In 1905
"The present King of England" denoted a certain man.
"The present King of France" denoted nothing at all.
Pegasus is a winged horse
Unicorns don’t exist

What, if anything, am I talking about when I talk about Zeus, unicorns, the Fountain of Youth, etc?

If I’m not talking about anything, how can my talk be meaningful?
If I’m not talking about anything, how can my talk be true or false?


*A second problem
Some denoting phrases denote ambiguously.

In “I saw a man,” “a man” denotes an “ambiguous” (or undetermined) man.

A good theory of denoting will accommodate all these kinds of cases.

Russell's Solution!
Analyze ordinary talk to reveal its true logical form beneath the surface
--> Denoting expressions are not names
A proper analysis of sentences in which denoting expressions occur solves our problems!

Tutorial #8. Frege On Sense and Reference. Discussion Questions

After having read Frege's On Sense and Reference, try to think about the following questions.

• What is the compositionality thesis?
• What is Frege’s identity puzzle? Can you give examples?
• What’s the Propositional attitude puzzle?
• How can expressions with the same sense refer to different things?
• Think about ‘Zeus’. How can a proper name have sense without reference?
• Why is the sense of a proper name not an idea in the mind of a thinker?
• Why does Frege think the distinction between sense and meaning is important?
• What are intensions?
• How would you analyze the sentence:
• "Matteo believes that Maria hopes that Miriam fears that Superman will not join us tonight."
• When is the connection between thought and truth-value important, and when is it not?
• How does Frege characterize a "logically perfect language"?

Tutorial #8. Frege On Sense and Reference. The Basics

Compositionality Thesis
The meaning of a whole sentence is determined by the meaning of its parts.
Substitutivity Principle
Replacing parts of a sentence with other expressions that mean the same thing should leave the of the whole sentence unchanged.

Frege’s Identity Puzzle
Informative identity statements like
(1) The Morning Star = The Evening Star.
Are different in “cognitive value” from trivial ones like
(2) The Morning Star = The Morning Star.

(2) appears to be true in virtue of language alone -everything is identical with itself-but (1) says something about the world.

"The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star" both mean (refer to) the same heavenly body.

So, by substitutivity, (1) and (2) should mean the same thing.
But they don’t so either we reject substitutivity or we show that “The Morning Star” and “The Evening Star” don’t mean the same thing.


Frege’s Propositional Attitude Puzzle

Propositional attitudes: ways in which people are related to propositions, e.g. believing, hoping, desiring, etc.

(3) Matteo believes that that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn.
(4) Matteo believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn.

(3) may be true even if (4) is false, even though.

(3) and (4) seem to ascribe the same belief to Matteo and hence to say the same thing, so how can one be true but the other false???

!Substitutivity seems to be violated

Toward a solution: the sense/reference distinction

“meaning” is ambiguous

Sense: dictionary meaning, the “thought” (NOT the idea that an individual has) behind an expression or sentence.

Reference: “aboutness,” what an expression picks out.

The sense of a name is an individual concept.
The sense of a predicate is a property or relation.
The sense of a sentence is a proposition.

The reference of a name is an individual.
The reference of a predicate is a set (of individuals or n-tuples of individuals).
The reference of a sentence is a truth value: either The True or The False.

The meaning of a whole sentence is determined by the meaning of its parts, but “meaning” is ambiguous.

Substitutivity Principles

- replacing parts of a sentence with other expressions that have the same sense leaves the sense of the whole sentence unchanged.

- replacing parts of a sentence with other expressions that have the same reference leaves the reference of the whole sentence unchanged.

Tutorial #7. Embodied Cognition. Discussion Questions

After having read Clark's Where Brain, Body and World Collide, think about the following questions:

• Does the state of your brain determine the phenomenal experiences you have?
• What is the sensorimotor theory of perception?
• What is the relationship between evolutionary thinking and embodied cognition?
• Is cognition a graded notion that comes in degree? Where does it start?
• What is the relation between perception and action?
• What role do intentions play in action? Try to make examples (think also about Clark’s examples).
• EC theorists argue that minds are shaped by particular bodies inhabiting particular environments. To what extent is this true? How would they account for highly abstract thinking e.g. chess playing, decision-making?
• What problems are faced by explanations of the mind that neglect to take the body into account?
• Think about Tetris. To what extent we use the environment to simplify our cognitive processes? Does the environment changes the nature of the processing or does it simply enable the organisms to use other inexpensive cognitive abilities?
• In which sense the environment is part of the cognitive system? Is this a trivial claim?
• Do blind people see with their canes? In which sense?
• Consider bees learning to forage on certain kind of highly-rewarding flowers. Is it necessary to consider the cognitive activities of the bees to include their environment? Or the environment simply a source of visual input?
• Consider the role of gesture during speech in different cultures. What is the effect of gesture on communication? Does it change the cognitive processes underlying communication (either in the listener or in the speaker) in any interesting way?
• Is it (at least sometimes) explanatorily more useful to see mind/brain as a computer? If so, why?

Tutorial #7. Embodied Cognition. Nuts and Bolts

Picture from Giulio Casseri(1552 ca. - 1616)


From "Embodied Cognition" by Monica Cowart, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://www.iep.utm.edu/embodcog/

Embodied Cognition is a growing research program in cognitive science that emphasizes the formative role the environment plays in the development of cognitive processes. The general theory contends that cognitive processes develop when a tightly coupled system emerges from real-time, goal-directed interactions between organisms and their environment; the nature of these interactions influences the formation and further specifies the nature of the developing cognitive capacities. Since embodied accounts of cognition have been formulated in a variety of different ways in each of the sub-fields comprising cognitive science (that is, developmental psychology, artificial life/robotics, linguistics, and philosophy of mind), a rich interdisciplinary research program continues to emerge. Yet, all of these different conceptions do maintain that one necessary condition for cognition is embodiment, where the basic notion of embodiment is broadly understood as the unique way an organism’s sensorimotor capacities enable it to successfully interact with its environmental niche. In addition, all of the different formulations of the general embodied cognition thesis share a common goal of developing cognitive explanations that capture the manner in which mind, body, and world mutually interact and influence one another to promote an organism’s adaptive success.